2.3. The Optimal Decision Rule - Readings

Required Reading:

• Buchanan and Tullock (1962), The Calculus of Consent, Chs. 3,5,6Again, you can buy several versions of this book, or here is the link to free PDF
  
  

After we’ve digested some political philosophy (with a dose of game theory), it’s time for a more “rigorous” model of choosing as a group. How should we decide how to decide?

We read the key chapters of Buchanan and Tullock’s classic 1962 Calculus of Consent, which (mostly) launched the field of public choice as the economic analysis of politics. Buchanan won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1986 for his contributions to this field.

Tips and Questions to Read for:

• “When will a society composed of free and rational utility-maximizing individuals choose to undertake action collectively rather than privately?”

• How do we determine the rules that will determine the rules by which we choose as a group?

• When/why is unanimity important? When might it make rational sense to depart from unanimity as a decision rule?

• What sorts of decisions should require more agreement, and what sorts of decisions should require less agreement?

• How is the optimal decision rule deduced?

• Should majorities decide everything? Why or why not?