class: center, middle, inverse, title-slide # 2.2: Beyond the Reach of Majorities ## ECON 410 · Public Economics · Spring 2020 ### Ryan Safner
Assistant Professor of Economics
safner@hood.edu
ryansafner/metricsf19
publicS20.classes.ryansafner.com
--- # Locke's Theory of the State of Nature .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ John Locke 1632-1704 ] ] ] .right-column[ .smallest[ > "[W]e must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, .hi[within the bounds of the law of nature]...But though this be a state of liberty, yet .hi[it is not a state of license]....hi[The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it], which obliges every one: and .hi[reason, which is that law], teaches all mankind....hi[no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions]... ," (Ch. II). ] .source[Locke, John, 1689, *Second Treatise on Government*] ] --- # Locke's Theory of the State of Nature .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ John Locke 1632-1704 ] ] ] .right-column[ .smallest[ > "And that .hi[all men may be restrained from invading others rights], and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed....hi[the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man's hands]...every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the law of nature" (Ch. II). ] .source[Locke, John, 1689, *Second Treatise on Government*] ] --- # Locke's Theory of the Origin of Government .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ John Locke 1632-1704 ] ] ] .right-column[ .smallest[ > "Why will he part with his freedom? ... Though .hi[in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others]...the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe very unsecure....hi[[He] is willing to join in society with others...for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates], which I call by the general name, .hi[property.]" (Ch. IX). ] .source[Locke, John, 1689, *Second Treatise on Government*] ] --- # Recall: Locke's Theory of Property .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ John Locke 1632-1704 ] ] ] .right-column[ .smallest[ > "Though .hi[the earth], and all inferior creatures, .hi[be common to all men], yet .hi[every man has a property in his own person]: this no body has any right to but himself. .hi[The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his]. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, .hi[he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property]...that .hi[excludes the common right of other men]: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, .hi[at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others]," (Ch. V). ] .source[Locke, John, 1689, *Second Treatise on Government*] ] --- # Locke's Theory of the Origin of Government .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ John Locke 1632-1704 ] ] ] .right-column[ .smallest[ > "The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property." (Ch. IX). - Three great "inconveniences" of the state of nature: 1. We lack rules that set common standards for all 2. We lack an impartial third party to judge disputes 3. We may be unable to enforce the law of nature on our own ] .source[Locke, John, 1689, *Second Treatise on Government*] ] --- class: inverse, center, middle # 87 Years Later... --- # Declaration of Independence .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ Thomas Jefferson 1743-1826 ] ] ] .right-column[ > We hold these truths to be .hi[self-evident], that .hi[all men are created equal], that they are endowed by their Creator with .hi[certain unalienable Rights], that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. .source[July 4, 1776 [*Declaration of Independence*](https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript)] ] --- # Declaration of Independence .left-column[ .center[  .smallest[ Thomas Jefferson 1743-1826 ] ] ] .right-column[ > That .hi[to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men], deriving their just powers .hi[from the consent of the governed], That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, .hi[it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it], and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, .hi[as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness] .source[July 4, 1776 [*Declaration of Independence*](https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript)] ] --- # Philadelphia, 1787 .center[  ] --- # The Story So Far .pull-left[ We need to .hi[create a State to constrain individuals] from interfering against one another... ] .pull-right[ .center[  ] ] --- # The Story So Far .pull-left[ We need to .hi[create a State to constrain individuals] from interfering against one another...but .hi[we also need to constrain the State] ] .pull-right[ .center[  ] ] --- # The State .left-column[ .center[  Max Weber 1864-1920 ] ] .right-column[ > "[A] State is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory." ] .source[Weber, Max, 1919, [*Politics as a Vocation*](http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Weber-Politics-as-a-Vocation.pdf)] --- # Madison's Paradox I .left-column[ .center[  James Madison 1751-1836 ] ] .right-column[ > "If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself," (Federalist 51). ] .source[1788, [*The Federalist Papers*](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp)] --- # Madison's Paradox II - .hi[Madison's Paradox]: a State strong enough to protect rights is strong enough to violate them at its discretion .center[  ] --- # Madison's Paradox .center[  ] --- # Madison's Paradox I .left-column[ .center[  James Madison 1751-1836 ] ] .right-column[ > "It is in vain to say that enlighten statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. .hi[Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm]," (Federalist 10). > "[E]xperience has taught mankind .hi[the necessity of auxiliary precautions]," (Federalist 51). ] .source[1788, [*The Federalist Papers*](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp)] --- # Credible Commitment .center[  *Odysseus and the Sirens* by John William Waterhouse, Scene from Homer's *The Odyssey* ] --- # Credible Commitment .center[  *Odysseus and the Sirens* by John William Waterhouse, Scene from Homer's *The Odyssey* ] --- # The Origin of Factions: Property? .left-column[ .center[  James Madison 1751-1836 ] ] .right-column[ > ".hi[The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate]...is an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. .hi[The protection of these faculties is the first object of government.] From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, .hi[the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results.]..ensues a .hi[division of society into different interests and parties]," (Federalist 10). ] .source[1788, [*The Federalist Papers*](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp)] --- # Factions .left-column[ .center[  James Madison 1751-1836 ] ] .right-column[ > "Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail." (Federalist 10). ] .source[1788, [*The Federalist Papers*](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp)] --- # Democracy .left-column[ .center[  James Madison 1751-1836 ] ] .right-column[ > ".hi[A pure democracy]...can admit of .hi[no cure for the mischiefs of faction]....hi[there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual]. Hence it is that such .hi[democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention]; have ever been found .hi[incompatible with personal security or the rights of property]; and .hi[have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths]," (Federalist 10). .source[1788, [*The Federalist Papers*](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp)] ] --- # Beyond the Reach of Majorities .pull-left[ .center[  ] ] .pull-right[ .smaller[ "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to .hi[withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy], .hi[to place them beyond the reach of majorities] and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other .hi[fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote]; they depend on the outcome of no elections." *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ] ] --- # Beyond the Reach of Majorities: Kansas-Nebraska Act 1854 .left-column[ .center[  ] ] .right-column[ .center[  ] ] --- # Democracy .center[  ] --- # Democracy .pull-left[ - .hi[Democracy] or .hi[majoritarianism]: rule by majority vote - **Pure democracy** is **unable to handle disagreement**, or protect individual rights - Democratic elements may be necessary, but is not sufficient for good governance ] .pull-right[ .center[  ] ] --- # Constitutions Constrain Majorities to Protect Individuals .pull-left[ - .hi[Constitutional rules] define the .hi-purple[domain of allowed collective decisions] and the .hi-purple[rules or procedures] for doing so - Their practical function is .hi-purple[to protect minorities from the majority] - "The individual is the smallest minority" ] .pull-right[ .center[  ] ] --- # Constitutional Rules vs. Political Rules .pull-left[ We must .hi[agree at a constitutional level] so that .hi-purple[we can disagree on political outcomes] ] .pull-right[ .center[  ] ] --- # Liberal Democracy, or Constitutional Republics .pull-left[ - No country in the world is a *pure* democracy - Often either a .hi[dictatorship] or a .hi[constitutional republic] (.hi["liberal democracy"]) - Constitutions must balance the will of the majority (.hi-purple[democracy]) with the rights and autonomy of the individual (.hi-purple[liberalism]), hence: .hi[liberal democracy] ] .pull-right[ .center[  ] ] --- # Madison's Filtration and the Extended Republic .left-column[ .center[  James Madison 1751-1836 ] ] .right-column[ - An .hi["extended republic"] that is large enough will create enough diverse factions so that no factions will be able to capture a majority - .hi[Filtration]: elected officials ought to pick higher elected officials rather than direct election - e.g. Senate (pre-1913), electoral college for President ]